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Abstract
This article presents a group of exercises of level and growth decomposition of output
per worker using cross-country data from 1960 to 2000. It is shown that at least until
1975 factors of production (capital and education) were the main source of output
dispersion across economies and that productivity variance was considerably smaller
than in later years. Only after this date did the prominence of productivity start
to show up in the data, as the majority of the literature has found. The growth
decomposition exercises showed that the reversal of relative importance of productivity
vis-a-vis factors is explained by the very good (bad) performance of productivity of fast-
(slow-) growing economies. Although growth in the period, is on average, is mostly
due to factor accumulation, its variance is explained by productivity.
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11 Introduction
Diﬀerences of output per worker across countries are known to be very high. For example,
in 2000 the average worker in the U.S. produced 33 times more than a worker in Uganda, 10
times more than one in India, and almost twice as much as one in Portugal. Several authors
have decomposed output per worker into the contribution of inputs and productivity, using
diﬀerent methods. In the early nineties, a few studies, e.g., Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) and Mankiw (1995) presented evidence that factors of production account for the
bulk of income diﬀerences across countries. Recent papers by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine (2001), among others,
however, have established what now seems to be a consensus that total factor productivity
is more relevant than factors of production in explaining output diﬀerences.
This paper takes development decomposition seriously. We redo the main exercises of
the literature for all years between 1960 and 2000 (and not only for one single year, which is
1985 or some year later in most articles in the literature). We use a neoclassical production
function with a Mincerian (e.g., Mincer (1974)) formulation of schooling returns to skills to
model human capital.
It turns out that the picture for earlier years is very diﬀerent from the one that emerged
from the literature. From 1960 to as late as 1975 factors are the main source of output-
per-worker dispersion. By the mid-eighties, factors and productivity have roughly the same
importance and from 1990 on productivity explains the bulk of international diﬀerences in
output per worker. In 1960 the correlation of productivity with output per worker (in log
terms) was 0.22, whereas the correlation of the latter with factor inputs was 0.71. Forty
years later, the correlation of output per worker with productivity jumped to 0.74, while its
correlation with factors did not change signiﬁcantly.
The relevant question, thus, is how one goes from a world where, at least until 1975,
diﬀerences in output levels are largely due to diﬀerences in physical and human capital, to
one where productivity plays the leading role. Our results show that one important reason
is that there was a strong process of convergence of factors of production, and of the capital-
output ratio in particular. Speciﬁcally, the variance of factors of production was nearly cut
in half between 1960 and 2000.
Another way to tackle this question is via growth-decomposition exercises for the sample
countries. The results show that the increase in the capital-output ratio and the educational
level of the labor force explain the mean growth of output per worker from 1960 to 2000,
while the behavior of productivity explains the variance of growth rates in the period. In
particular, inputs explain 80% of the growth of output per worker, whereas the contribuition
2of the variance of productivity to the variance of the growth rate of output per worker is more
than three times larger than that of factors. That is, capital deepening and human-capital
accumulation are general phenomena experienced by most countries. However, good (bad)
growth performance is, in great measure, explained by high (low) productivity growth. In
conjunction with the convergence of factors of production, this is the main reason behind
the change in the pattern of income-level decomposition.
Some particular experiences are helpful in understanding this fact. In 1960, productivity
in Latin America was very close to that of the leading economies, a fact often neglected
in the literature. It was, on average, 182% higher than the average productivity of the
“Asian Tigers”.1 Forty years later, after having fallen 9%, productivity in Latin America
was way below that of the industrial economies and 33% smaller than the average level of
the Asian Tigers. At the same time, as a group, the Latin American economies had the
second worst productivity growth record in the world. In contrast, productivity in the East
Asian economies grew at an annual rate almost 3 percentage points above the world average.
Not surprisingly, these countries are among the fastest-growing economies in the period. In
other words, growth miracles (disasters) are mostly productivity miracles (disasters).
The paper is organized in ﬁve sections in addition to this introduction. In the next
section we present the methodology of all exercises, the data and calibration procedures.
Section 3 presents the results of the level-decomposition exercises and Section 4 those of
the growth-accounting exercises. Section 5 further explores these results and discusses the
performance of Latin America and fast-growing Asian economies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Speciﬁcation, Data and Calibration
2.1 Model





where Yit is the output of country i at time t, K stands for physical capital, H is human
capital per worker, L is raw labor and A is labor-augmenting productivity. Notice that, in
this speciﬁcation, total factor productivity (TFP) is given by A
1−α
it .
We use a Mincerian (e.g., Mincer (1974)) formulation of schooling returns to skills to
model human capital, H. There is only one type of labor in the economy with skill level
1Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand and Taiwan.
3determined by its educational attainment. It is assumed that the skill level of a worker with
h years of schooling is H = expφ(h) greater than that of a worker with no education, leading






Our ﬁrst objective is to understand the relative contribution of inputs and productivity
to international diﬀerences of output per worker in each year of our sample. The main
question here is whether the prominent role played by productivity in recent periods is also
a feature of previous years. In that sense, 41 variance-decomposition exercises, for the years
from 1960 to 2000, are performed. We follow Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall
and Jones (1999), among others, rewriting the per-worker production function in terms of
the capital-output ratio. This formulation allows decomposing the variation of output per
worker into variations of productivity, human capital, and the capital-output ratio. In this
















where κ is the capital-output ratio. Taking logs of (2):
lnyit = lnAit +
α
1 − α
lnκit + φ(hit). (3)
Our second objective is to study the relative contribution of factors and productivity
to the growth performance of countries. We start from expression (3) above to obtain the
following growth-decomposition expression between two arbitrary periods:
∆lny = ∆lnA +
α
1 − α
∆lnκ + ∆φ(h), (4)
where ∆ is the variation of a given variable between two periods.
The advantage of the decomposition above with respect to the traditional growth-accounting
procedures is that the accumulation of capital induced by an increase in productivity will
be rightly attributed to productivity growth. Moreover, this decomposition also allows us to
assess to what extent the trajectory of a given economy reﬂects transitional dynamics or a
balanced growth trajectory. In particular, the neoclassical model predicts that in balanced





Hence, depending on the value of the expression above,we can assess the distance any given
economy is from a balanced growth path.
2.2 Calibration and data
The speciﬁcation of the function φ(h) takes into account international evidence (e.g., Psacharopou-
los (1994)) of a positive and diminishing relationship between average schooling and return
to education. Hence, instead of the more usual linear return to education, we follow Bils and






According to their calibration, we have ψ = 0.58 and θ = 0.32. In addition to these
parameters, we need to set the values of α and δ, the depreciation rate used to construct
the capital series. For α, we use 0.40: estimates in Gollin (2002) of the capital share of
output for a variety of countries ﬂuctuate around this value, a number also close to that of
the American economy according to the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
We use the same depreciation rate for all economies, which was calculated from US data.
We employed the capital stock at market prices, investment at market prices, I, as well as
the law of motion of capital to estimate the implicit depreciation rate according to:




From this calculation, we obtained δ = 3.5% per year (average of the 1950-2000 period).
We used data for 83 countries during the period 1960-2000.2 Data on output per worker
and investment rates were obtained from the Penn-World Table (PWT), version 6.1. We
used data on the average educational attainment of the population aged 15 years and over,
interpolated (in levels) to ﬁt an annual frequency, taken from Barro and Lee (2000).
The physical capital series is constructed with real investment data from the PWT us-
ing the Perpetual Inventory Method. In this case we need an estimate of the initial cap-
ital stock. We approximate it, following Hall and Jones (1999), among many, by K0 =
2See the Appendix for a list of the countries included in the sample.
5I0/[(1 + g)(1 + n) − (1 − δ)], where K0 is the initial capital stock, I0 is the initial invest-
ment expenditure, g is the rate of technological progress and n is the growth rate of the
population. In this calculation we follow the standard assumption that all economies were in
a balanced growth path at time zero, so that I−j = (1 + n)
−j (1 + g)
−j I0.3 To minimize the
impact of economic ﬂuctuations we used the average investment of the ﬁrst ﬁve years as a
measure of I0. When data was available, we started this procedure taking 1950 as the initial
year in order to reduce the eﬀect of K0 in the capital stock series. We obtained the rate
of technological progress by adjusting an exponential trend to the U.S. output-per-worker
series, correcting for the increase in the average schooling of the labor force and obtained
g =1.53%. The population growth rate, n, is the average annual growth rate of population
in each economy between 1960 and 2000, calculated from population data in the PWT.
In order to compute the value of Ait, we use the observed values of yit and the constructed









In this section we perform development-accounting exercises, based on variance decomposi-
tions of output per worker for each year from 1960 to 2000. In most of our calculations we
follow Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and compare the contribution of X, a composite







it ), with that of productivity. From (3), we have:
lnyit = lnAit + lnXit. (7)
However, as opposed to these authors, we decompose the variance of ln(y) according to its
mathematical expression, allowing for a covariance term between factors and productivity:
var(lnyit) = var(lnAit) + var(lnXit) + 2cov(lnAit,lnXit). (8)
This is important in the present context because, as we will see shortly, the covariance
component has a marked change of behavior in the period, so that leaving it out would imply
3While rich countries may satisfy the balanced-growth assumption in the initial year, for poor countries
the investment rates were probably lower before than after the initial year for which there is available data.
Hence, the balanced-growth assumption possibly overestimates the initial capital stocks of the latter. (see
Caselli (2004)). We will discuss in detail the sensitivity of our results to the initial capital stock.
6discarding an important piece of information about the nature of output dispersion.4 Figure
1 displays, for each year of our sample, the relative contribution of the 3 components of the
variance of (the log of) output per worker. Table 1 presents the absolute values of all the

































Figure 1: Output-per-worker variance decomposition (1960-2000)
Figure 1 and Table 1 reveal a number of interesting facts. First, output-per-worker
dispersion increases throughout the period, especially in the nineties. In particular, the
variance of lny increased from 0.84 in 1960 to 1.11 in 1990 and 1.32 in 2000. Second, there
is a continuous reduction of the absolute importance of factors in accounting for output
dispersion. Between 1960 and 2000, the variance of lnX declines nearly 50%, from 0.70 to
0.36. Hence, while a strong process of output divergence is observed, factor levels converge.
4The variance-decomposition formula used by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) is given by var(lnyit) =
cov(lnyit,lnAit) + cov(lnyit,lnXit). In terms of (8), this amounts to dividing the covariance term
2cov(lnAit,lnXit) equally between lnAit and lnXit. In the Appendix, we present results for this variance
decomposition.
7Table 1: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.84 0.70 0.45 -0.31
1965 0.89 0.63 0.42 -0.15
1970 0.92 0.56 0.35 0.01
1975 0.93 0.54 0.38 0.01
1980 0.99 0.44 0.39 0.16
1985 0.99 0.42 0.37 0.20
1990 1.11 0.38 0.44 0.29
1995 1.25 0.36 0.54 0.34
2000 1.32 0.36 0.59 0.36
Third, the variance of lnA is relatively stable until 1990. By 2000, however, its value
was 31% larger than its value in 1960. As a result of the previous two facts, the relative
importance of factors in accounting for the variance of output per worker fell considerably
during the period. In 1960 the contribution of the variance of factors of production to the
variance of output per worker was 55% higher than that of productivity. By the mid-eighties
the variance of factors and productivity had roughly the same importance, whereas in 2000
factor variance was 39% smaller.
Finally, the covariance between factors and productivity increases continually. As a
matter of fact, it changes signs, going from -0.15 to 0.18 throughout the period. This means
that in 1960 those economies that displayed high productivity were not necessarily those
with high factor endowment, but by 2000 productivity, capital intensity and education were
positively correlated across countries.
Figures 2 and 3 display productivity levels, relative to the US, plotted against relative
output per worker in 1960 and 2000. As the ﬁgures show, the relationship between the two
variables is much weaker in 1960 than in 2000. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of a simple OLS
regression of relative productivity on relative output per worker is only 0.05 (R2 = 0.0005)
in 1960, whereas in 2000 the regression coeﬃcient is 0.76 (R2 = 0.47).5
5In 1975, the cross-country relationship between relative productivity and relative output per worker is
weak. In particular, the regression coeﬃcient is 0.34 (R2 = 0.05). This suggests that the result showing that
this relationship became stronger over time is not an artifact of the method we used to construct the initial
capital stock.
8Figure 2: 1960 Figure 3: 2000
The picture that emerges from the results above shows that in 1960 the variability of
productivity was lower while that of factors was higher. In contrast, throughout the period
there was a strong process of convergence of factors of production. Moreover, especially
after the mid-eighties, the variability of productivity increased. In a certain sense, this result
qualiﬁes the literature on international diﬀerences in levels of output per worker (Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine
(2001), among others), whose main ﬁnding is that productivity diﬀerences account for the
bulk of the dispersion of output per worker across countries. We ﬁnd that this is a recent
fact: in 1960 quite the opposite occurred, and factors, not productivity, explained most of
the output-per-worker variation.
Take for instance the BK3 decomposition of Table 2 in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997). It was calculated using 1985 data and the production function and human capital
formulation were similar to the one we use. They found that factors explained 53% of output-
per-worker variance, with productivity accounting for the remaining 47%. Using the same
methodology used by these authors, we ﬁnd that the relative importance of X and A in
1985 was 52% and 48%, respectively, very close to their ﬁgures (see the Appendix for the
calculations). However, values are considerably diﬀerent when we use 1960 data, as in this
case 64% of the output variance is explained by factors. This result is reversed in 2000, when
productivity accounts for 58% of output-per-worker dispersion.
One could argue that our claim that the importance of TFP is increasing over time is
driven by measurement error. It could be the case that since for most countries reliable
data starts in 1960, the initial capital-stock ﬁgures are only very rough approximations, so
that our estimates of the capital stock grow more accurate over time as we use better data.
9Hence, the ﬁnding that factor diﬀerences accounted for more income diﬀerences in 1960 may
simply reﬂect the fact that we are measuring K1960 with a large error. We believe this is not
the case and that results are robust to the capital-stock series used.
In order to verify the sensitivity of the results to the capital-stock series, we performed
several robustness exercises (see the Appendix for more details). First, we reconstructed K
using depreciation rates of 7% and 10.5%, which imply a faster decline of the importance of
the initial capital stock. Results did not change much, and as far as 1975 the variance of
lnX dominates that of lnA ( 0.52 and 0.39, respectively, using a depreciation rate of 10.5%).
In both cases the importance of A increases over time. Second, in order to reduce the role of
the initial-capital stock, we also perform calculations focusing on the sample of 54 countries
for which there is complete investment data starting in 1950. The results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained with our full sample. The contribution of the variance of factors of
production to the variance of output per worker was 81% higher than that of productivity in
1960. As late as 1975, the relative contributions of factors and productivity were very similar
to their 1960 ﬁgures, whereas in 2000 the variance of factors was 35% smaller than that of
productivity. We also observe the same patterns of convergence of factors and divergence of
productivity over time.
In a third exercise, still using the smaller 54-country sample, we constructed a counter-
factual capital-stock series in which the initial capital-output ratio is equal to 2 in 1950 for
all countries. Of course, this is an extreme assumption that biases the results against our
ﬁndings. Even in this case we found that, at least since 1975, both the absolute and relative
importance of the variance of factors as a source of output dispersion declined, whereas the
variance of productivity increased. Moreover, the covariance between factors and productiv-
ity increases since 1975. Fourth, note that in the early ﬁfties, Japan and several countries
in Continental Europe had very high investment rates, due to the reconstruction eﬀort af-
ter the Second World War. For these economies the balanced-growth assumption used to
calculate the initial capital stock in 1950 yields capital-output ratios far above the observed
ratio in the US, while the marginal productivity of capital is at the same time very low. In
these cases we constructed an alternative measure of K0 so that the marginal productivity of
capital in 1950 was 20% above that of the U.S.. This value of the MPK seems high enough
to be consistent with the investment rates observed in the post-war period and prevents the
capital-output ratio from declining in some countries. Once again, results are qualitatively
similar to the ones reported in the text.
The main ﬁndings are also robust to methodology changes. Note that in this paper
capital is measured using the capital-output ratio. However, Bosworth and Collins (2003)
argue that this formulation overstates the importance of TFP since, for instance, both TFP
10and capital may vary together due to a third factor. In their opinion, the truth may lie
between this representation and one with capital-labor ratio, although in their exercises they
use the latter. Our results, presented in the Appendix, are qualitatively similar if we do the
same. Speciﬁcally, the relative importance of productivity increases over time as a source
of output-per-worker dispersion, as does the covariance between factors and productivity.
Factors accounted for 77% of output-per-worker dispersion in 1960 but only 45% in 2000.
We provide an additional piece of evidence of the robustness of the pattern of the corre-
lation across countries between A and X by examining the correlation between productivity
and the relative price of investment (data once again was obtained from the Penn-World
Table, version 6.1). As can be observed in Figure 4 below, there is a striking negative asso-
ciation over time between the correlation of factors and productivity, on the one hand, and
the correlation between productivity and the relative price of investment, p, on the other
hand. In 1960, the correlation between A and X (in logs) was -0.27, whereas the correlation
between A and p (in logs) was 0.15. Hence, in 1960 the more productive countries had
smaller capital-output ratios (and factors in general). This is consistent with the observed
positive correlation between A and p, which indicates that high-productivity countries had
a higher relative price of investment in 1960. In 2000, on the other hand, the correlation
between A and X was 0.40, whereas the correlation between A and p was -0.22. In other
words, in 2000 the high-productivity countries had higher capital-output ratios (and factors
in general). This is consistent with the negative correlation between A and p, which indicates

















































































































































Figure 4: Correlations between productivity, factors and the relative price of investment
(1960-2000)
Hence, we conclude that our main ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent assumptions about
the capital-input measure, depreciation rates, country sample and initial capital stocks.
Moreover, data on the relative price of investment gives further support to our ﬁndings on the
evolution over time of the covariance between factors and productivity6. It should be noticed
that there is nothing essentially wrong with previous results on the relative importance of
factors and productivity as sources of output-per-worker dispersion. Our point is that one
cannot generalize them to early years. The relevant question is how one goes from a world
where, at least until 1975, diﬀerences in output levels are largely due to diﬀerences in physical
and human capital, to one where productivity plays the leading role. This is what we examine
in the next section.
4 Growth Accounting
In this section we investigate the contribution of the various components of the production
function to the growth experience, from 1960 to 2000, of 83 economies. We use equation (4),
6Note also that, as pointed out by Caselli (2004), the balanced-growth assumption possibly overestimates
the initial capital stocks of poor countries in the initial year and, as a result, may bias downward the relative
contribution of the variance of factors to the variance of y. This implies that the prominence of factors as a
source of output dispersion in the early sixties was probably even higher than the one we obtained.
12so that the variation of the log of output per worker in the period is decomposed into the
contribution of productivity,7 the capital-output ratio and human capital per worker.
In our sample average output per worker went from US$ 7,127 in 1960 to US$ 14,683 in
2000, growing 106% in the period.8 Throughout this paper all results for averages of a given
variable among countries were obtained from geometric averages of the given variable across
the relevant group of countries. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics using 1960 and
2000 ﬁgures (we set A = 100 for the US in 1960):
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (1960-2000)
y60 y00 A60 A00 κ60 κ00 h60 h00
sample average US$ 7,127 US$ 14,683 58 67 1.69 2.24 2.9 6.1
In the last forty years, mean productivity increased by 15.4%. On average, economies
became more capital-intensive, with an increase in the capital-output ratio of 33%. A vig-
orous increase in education was also observed, jumping on average from 2.9 years in 1960 to
6.1 years in 2000.
In Table 3 we divide the economies in 5 groups, according to their growth rates of output
per worker: in the economic “Miracles” group (15 economies), the growth rate of output per
worker ranged from 3.28% to 6.12% per year; in the “Fast Growth” group (14 economies),
it ranged from 2.39% to 3.18%; in “Medium Growth” (22 economies), from 1.46% to 2.07%;
in “Slow Growth” (19 economies), from 0.61% to 1.45%; and in the economic “Disasters”
group (14 economies), the average growth rate ranged from -3.25% to 0.44% per year. This
procedure is somewhat arbitrary but it serves our purpose of calling attention to diﬀerent
patterns of development across economies.
7As mentioned above, it should be noticed that TFP = A1−α. However, in the growth decomposition,
the contribution of TFP is given by the (log) variation of A, which captures both the direct and indirect
(via capital accumulation) eﬀect of TFP on the growth rate of output per worker.
8All ﬁgures are in 1996 values, corrected for PPP.
13Table 3: Annual Growth Rates (1960-2000)
country groups y A H κ I/Y
Full Sample 1.84% 0.36% 1.00% 0.71% 15%
Miracles 4.36% 2.72% 1.14% 0.74% 20%
Fast Growth 2.72% 1.14% 1.06% 0.78% 19%
Medium Growth 1.77% 0.43% 0.97% 0.55% 18%
Slow Growth 0.96% -0.18% 0.83% 0.47% 12%
Disasters -0.59% -2.41% 1.04% 1.16% 8%
correlation w/ y 100% 84% 23% -4% 53%
note: I/Y in levels (cross time cross group geometric average)
The average capital-output ratio grew at 0.71% a year, while average productivity in-
creased 0.36% annually. Table 3 shows that productivity growth increases monotonically
with the average growth rate of output per worker. While for the “Miracles”, productivity
growth averaged 2.72% per year, for the “Disasters” the average growth of A was negative.
In fact, the correlation between growth of output per worker and productivity growth was
very large in the period (0.84).
The correlation of the growth rate of output per worker with the investment rate was rel-
atively smaller, 53%, although average I/Y increases monotonically, across groups, with the
growth rate. Moreover, the capital-output ratio raised in all groups, even in the “Disasters”
economies (which experienced the highest growth of the capital-output ratio). In fact, the
correlation between the growth rates of output per worker and the capital-output ratio is
close to zero, something already noted by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) for the period
1960-1985. Table 3 also shows that average human capital increased 1.00% annually, but its
correlation with y growth is small (23%). In fact, the growth rate of H is very similar across
groups.
14Table 4: Growth Decomposition (1960-2000)
country groups y κ H A
Full Sample 1.84% 0.47% 1.00% 0.36%
(26%) (54%) (20%)
Miracles 4.36% 0.49% 1.14% 2.72%
(11%) (26%) (62%)
Fast Growth 2.72% 0.52% 1.06% 1.14%
(19%) (39%) (42%)
Medium Growth 1.77% 0.37% 0.97% 0.43%
(21%) (55%) (24%)
Slow Growth 0.96% 0.31% 0.83% -0.18%
(32%) (86%) (-19%)
Disasters -0.59% 0.77% 1.04% -2.41%
(-130%) (-176%) (406%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions
of each factor to output-per-worker growth.
Table 4 presents the growth decomposition exercises for each group between 1960 and
2000. The ﬁrst line of the table shows the important role played by factors to explain growth
rates. On average, 80% of the observed growth of output per worker can be accounted for by
human- and physical-capital accumulation, while only 20% is due to productivity growth.9
Human capital alone accounts for 54% of output-per-worker growth.
Notice, however, that the sample average hides a lot of information with respect to
the behavior of diﬀerent economies. In the faster-growth group, the “Miracles” economies,
62% of output-per-worker growth is explained by productivity growth. This number falls
monotonically with the average growth rate in each group: it is 42% in the “Fast Growth”
group, 24%for the “MediumGrowers” and -19%for the “Slow Growers”. For the “Disasters”,
the fall in productivity accounts for 406% of the decline in output per worker. In other
words, economic miracles were productivity miracles. By the same token, poor performers
in general, and disasters in particular, had a very bad record of productivity growth.
Results in Tables 3 and 4 allow us to conclude that the increase in the capital-output
ratio and the educational level of the labor force explain the mean growth of output per
9Baier et al (2004) found a relative contribution of TFP for output per worker growth of 14%, using data
for a sample of 145 countries, spanning more than a hundred years for 23 of those countries. In most of
their calculations they use weighted average growth rates, in which the weights are the country´s labor force
in 2000 and the number of years for which data for the country is available. For the unweighted relative
contribution of TFP they obtained a startling value of -109%.
15worker, while the behavior of productivity explains the variation of growth rates among
groups. This result is similar if we use the median instead of the mean.
Another way to assess the importance of productivity for growth diﬀerences between
countries is to perform a decomposition of the variance of the growth rate of output-per-
worker in terms of the variance of factors and productivity growth and the covariance between
factor growth and A growth. Using (4), we can decompose the variance of output per worker
growth as follows:
var(∆lny) = var(∆lnA) + var(∆lnX) + 2cov(∆lnA,∆lnX). (9)
Table 5 presents the variance-decomposition results for the growth rate of output per
worker. The table shows that productivity growth accounted for the bulk of the variance
of output-per-worker growth between 1960 and 2000. Speciﬁcally, the variance of A growth
accounted for 129% of the growth variance, whereas the variance of factor growth accounted
for only 35% of the dispersion of output-per-worker growth.10
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of Growth Rates
period var(∆lny) var(∆lnX) var(∆lnA) 2covar(∆lnX,∆lnA)
1960-2000 0.51 0.18 0.66 -0.32
1960-1970 0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.07
1970-1980 0.07 0.04 0.12 -0.09
1980-1990 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.05
1990-2000 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.05
Easterly (2001) documents the fact that in the period 1980-1998, median per-capita
income growth in developing countries was 0.0 percent, as compared to 2.5 percent in 1960-
79. This occurred despite the fact that several variables that are supposed to enhance
growth improved over the latter period, such as health, education, fertility, infrastructure
and macroeconomic variables, including the inﬂation rate and the degree of real overvaluation
of local currency. In order to assess whether this pattern is veriﬁed in our sample, we present
in Table 6 growth-accounting results for two sub-periods: 1960-1980 and 1980-2000.
Table 6 shows that there was in fact a signiﬁcant growth slowdown after 1980. Speciﬁcally,
average growth in the sample declined from 2.67% in 1960-1980 to 0.99% in 1980-2000. From
10Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) found that the variance of productivity growth explains between
86% and 91% of the variance of output-per-worker growth. The formula used by these authors ignores the
covariance between factors and productivity growth. Using the same formula, we obtain that the variance of
A growth accounts for 97% of the variance of y growth between 1960 and 2000. In the Appendix, we present
results for this variance decomposition.
16the table we can also observe that the fall in productivity growth was the main culprit of
the growth slowdown. In fact, for the whole sample A growth was positive until 1980 (1.05%
per year) and became negative since then (-0.33% per year), whereas the growth rates of the
capital-output ratio and human capital per worker declined much less. This pattern is also
observed for all groups. In the period 1960-1980, only the disasters experienced negative
A growth, whereas in the subsequent period the “Slow Growth” and “Medium Growth”
countries also underwent an absolute decline in productivity.
Table 6: Growth Decomposition by Sub-periods
1960-1980 1980-2000
country groups y κ H A y κ H A
Full Sample 2.67% 0.53% 1.09% 1.05% 0.99% 0.42% 0.91% -0.33%
(20%) (41%) (39%) (42%) (92%) (-33%)
Miracles 4.93% 0.28% 1.26% 3.39% 3.78% 0.70% 1.03% 2.05%
(6%) (25%) (69%) (18%) (27%) (54%)
Fast Growth 3.58% 0.59% 1.14% 1.85% 1.86% 0.45% 0.98% 0.43%
(16%) (32%) (52%) (24%) (53%) (23%)
Medium Growth 2.47% 0.41% 1.04% 1.02% 1.08% 0.33% 0.90% -0.15%
(17%) (42%) (41%) (30%) (84%) (-14%)
Slow Growth 1.96% 0.45% 0.91% 0.60% -0.04% 0.16% 0.75% -0.96%
(23%) (46%) (31%) (-374%) (-1717%) (2191%)
Disasters 0.48% 1.02% 1.16% -1.70% -1.71% 0.53% 0.93% -3.17%
(213%) (241%) (-354%) (-31%) (-54%) (185%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions of each factor to output-per-worker
growth.
Summing up the results, capital deepening and human-capital accumulation are general
phenomena experienced by most countries. On the other hand, good (bad) growth per-
formance is, in great measure, explained by high (low) productivity growth. In conjunction
with factors convergence, this is the main reason behind the change in the pattern of output-
per-worker level decomposition documented in the previous section. In 1960, for historical
reasons outside the scope of this article, inputs were the decisive diﬀerence between rich and
poor countries. Between this date and the end of the century, fast growers experienced a
signiﬁcant increase in productivity, while slow growers lagged behind or even reduced their
productivity level, so that productivity-variance increased signiﬁcantly. Factors-dispersion,
in contrast, declined in the same period. Hence, in 2000 the relative contribution of produc-
17tivity in explaining international income diﬀerences rose substantially and surpassed that of
inputs.
5 The Performance of Cultural and Regional Groups
The role of institutions and cultural factors in the economic performance of countries has
been the subject of an increasing number of studies in the ﬁelds of history and economics (e.g.,
North (1990), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1994) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001),
among many). In one way or another, societies may choose or inherit sets of laws, institutions
and social conventions that are more inducive to investment in business, technology and
education and that perform better in protecting property rights and the fruits of these
investments. In these countries, the incentives and productivity are higher, and so are
investment and growth.
In this section, countries are divided into broad groups on a cultural or geographical basis.
Here our objectives are two-fold. First, we would like to understand better the evolution
of productivity in the period, and the proposed group division may shed some light on this
subject. Second, this division reveals growth facts neglected in the literature that will allow
us to provide evidence related to some important questions. For instance, we found that
as late as 1975, Latin American productivity was high by international standards, that A
growth subsequently was strongly negative and that most of the growth in the region between
1960 and 2000 was via factor accumulation. Countries in the region may have experienced
transitional growth in that period, which has important implications in terms of their future
growth trajectory.
We divided economies in 9 groups, which are presented in detail in the Appendix. They
are Western Europe, South Europe, English (-speaking), Asian Tigers, Middle East, South
Asia, Latin America, Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.11 The ﬁrst group has 12 countries
that comprise most of Western Europe, with exceptions such as Portugal and Spain (which
belong, together with Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, to “South Europe”) and the United
Kingdom. The latter belongs to the English-speaking group, which also has USA, New
Zealand, Australia, Ireland and, less accurately, Canada. Asian Tigers are Singapore, Korea,
Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand and Taiwan. There are 5 and 9 economies, respectively, in the
next two groups and 18 in Latin America, which also includes Caribbean countries that speak
mostly Latin languages. The Caribbean group contains only 4 countries and the Sub-Sahara
11It should be mentioned that our sample of Sub-Saharan countries is very incomplete, as we did not
include in our sample those economies for which data is available only after 1960. Our Middle East group
actually includes one country from North Africa (Tunisia).
18contains 18. Table 7 presents averages and growth rates for some variables by cultural and
regional groups (we still set A = 100 for the US in 1960).
Each cell displays cross-country geometric means of a given statistic in the group. We
can observe that the Asian Tigers, on average, experienced an extraordinary growth of
productivity of 261% between 1960 and 2000. Whereas in 1960 the level of A for the Asian
Tigers was only 35% of the correspondent value for English-speaking countries, by 2000
this ratio had increased to 75%. The big losers are Latin American economies and the
Sub-Sahara region, with mean reductions of productivity of 16% and 29%, respectively. It
should be noticed that this decline in productivity in Latin America occurred after 1975.
The level of productivity in Latin America, at least until 1975, was close to that observed in
the advanced countries. In 1960 it corresponded to 79% of the level of A in the US, whereas
in 1975 it had increased to 89%. By the end of the century, however, this ratio had shrinked
to 45%.12 We will discuss these results for Latin America in more detail in the next section.
Table 7: Average levels and growth rates (1960-2000)
country groups ∆y60−00 A1960 A1975 A2000 ∆A60−00 κ1960 κ2000 ∆κ60−00
English (-speaking) 118% 78 98 130 65% 2.64 2.96 12%
Western Europe 140% 71 96 116 63% 3.43 3.93 15%
South Europe 267% 56 90 106 89% 2.34 3.02 29%
Asian Tigers 636% 27 55 98 261% 2.08 3.30 59%
Middle East 149% 86 117 103 19% 1.81 2.01 11%
South Asia 146% 60 57 54 -9% 0.89 1.75 97%
Latin America 42% 79 103 66 -16% 1.67 2.11 26%
Caribbean 87% 45 63 66 48% 2.70 2.33 -14%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37% 42 43 30 -29% 0.94 1.39 48%
With the exception of the Caribbean countries, in all groups the capital-output ratio
increased in the period, with the South Asian countries experiencing the biggest boost in
capital intensity. The Asian Tigers and Sub-Saharan countries experienced an increase in
κ of 59% and 48%, respectively. There was an increase in the capital-output ratio even in
groups, such as the English-speaking and Western Europe, where capital deepening in 1960
was relatively high by international standards. This result conﬁrms that the period between
1960 and 2000 was characterized by widespread factor accumulation, now taking cultural or
geographical factors as our standpoint.
12These results for Latin America are similar if we consider only the most populated countries in 2000
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Chile). Speciﬁcally, for this group of Latin
American countries, the values of A were 79 in 1960, 107 in 1975 and 72 in 2000.
19Table 8 summarizes the growth-decomposition exercises for each group. The methodology
is exactly the same as that of Table 4. In the ﬁrst four groups,between one half and two thirds
of the growth of output per worker is due to A growth. The contribution of productivity to
output-per-worker growth is particularly high for the East Asian Tigers, both in absolute
and relative terms, a point to which we shall return below. At the other extreme, Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a fall in productivity throughout the period,
which was oﬀset by the contribution of factors to growth.
Table 8: Growth Decomposition (1960-2000), Cultural
and Regional Groups
country groups y κ H A
English (-speaking) 1.94% 0.19% 0.49% 1.26%
(10%) (25%) (65%)
Western Europe 2.17% 0.21% 0.72% 1.23%
(10%) (33%) (57%)
South Europe 3.33% 0.40% 1.25% 1.68%
(12%) (37%) (50%)
Asian Tigers 5.04% 0.78% 1.02% 3.24%
(15%) (20%) (64%)
Middle East 2.29% 0.17% 1.68% 0.45%
(7%) (73%) (19%)
South Asia 2.26% 1.13% 1.36% -0.23%
(50%) (60%) (-10%)
Latin America 0.87% 0.38% 0.93% -0.45%
(44%) (107%) (-51%)
Caribbean 1.58% -0.25% 0.84% 0.99%
(-16%) (53%) (63%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.78% 0.66% 1.01% -0.90%
(86%) (130%) (-115%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions
of each factor to output-per-worker growth.
5.1 Latin America Stagnation
The growth-decomposition results for selected Latin American economies presented in Table
9 reveal that most countries in the region experienced a decline in productivity between 1960
and 2000, and consequently growth was mostly due to factor accumulation. One exception
20is Chile, which had a signiﬁcant increase in A. On the other hand, the fall in productivity
was particularly stong in Venezuela and Paraguay.
Table 9: Growth Decomposition (1960-2000)- Latin America
country groups y κ H A
World average 1.84% 0.47% 1.00% 0.36%
(26%) (54%) (20%)
Latin America average 0.87% 0.38% 0.93% -0.45%
(44%) (107%) (-51%)
Argentina 0.79% 0.39% 0.95% -0.56%
(50%) (121%) (-71%)
Brazil 1.71% 0.45% 0.78% 0.48%
(26%) (46%) (28%)
Chile 1.91% -0.42% 0.66% 1.66%
(—22%) (35%) (87%)
Colombia 0.83% 0.07% 0.75% 0.02%
(8%) (90%) (2%)
Costa Rica 0.67% 0.90% 0.65% -0.88%
(133%) (97%) (-130%)
Ecuador 1.45% 0.12% 1.06% 0.27%
(8%) (73%) (19%)
Mexico 1.53% 0.53% 1.47% -0.48%
(35%) (97%) (-32%)
Paraguay 0.87% 1.41% 0.82% -1.36%
(162%) (94%) (-156%)
Uruguay 0.95% -0.42% 0.61% 0.75%
(-44%) (65%) (80%)
Venezuela -0.88% 0.13% 1.23% -2.25%
(-14%) (-139%) (254%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions
of each factor to output per worker growth.
Moreover, productivity deterioration was observed mainly in the last two decades of the
sample, especially in the eighties,13 when none of the economies of the region had positive
13Among the possible reasons for the productivity decline in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s are
the oil shocks in the 1970s, perhaps magniﬁed in countries with signiﬁcant social conﬂicts and poor conﬂict-
management institutions, as argued in Rodrik (1999). Other possible reasons include the debt crisis in the
1980s and the growth slowdown of the developed countries, as argued in Easterly (2001).
21A growth. In this decade A fell by 3.35% per year. In the following decade A fell by 0.74%
annually in the region. If we consider only the most populated Latin American countries,
A fell by 3.37% annually in the eighties and was nearly stagnant in the nineties (a decrease
of 0.17% per year). Figure 6 below presents the evolution of A for selected countries, the
regional average and US productivity as a benchmark for comparison. As is clear from the
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Figure 5: Productivity in Latin America, 1960-2000 (US, 1960=100)
Cole et al (2005) conclude that most of the gap in income per capita between Latin
America and the US is due to low TFP in Latin America. They also argue that competi-
tive barriers are possibly an important determinant of low TFP in Latin America. Related
research by Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2004) argues that import-substitution industrializa-
tion and targeted investment subsidies may be key determinants of low productivity in Latin
America. Our results put these conjectures in question, since productivity in Latin America
was relatively high in a period (1960-1980) that was characterized by widespread state inter-
vention in the economy and import-substitution industrialization. The evidence in Figure 6
(and Table 7) show that at least until the mid-seventies, productivity in Latin America was
close to the level observed in the US, and that in the mid-seventies some Latin American
14Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and R. Soto (2001) had already made the point that Chile’s TFP growth was
exceptionally good (for Latin America).
22countries had a level of A which was nearly equal to or even higher than US productivity
(in the case of Brazil and Mexico, respectively).
5.2 The Asian Tigers Growth Miracle
In Table 10 we present growth-decomposition results for the Asian Tigers. This table re-
inforces our conclusion that growth miracles were mainly productivity miracles. With the
exception of South Korea, all countries in this group experienced a contribution of productiv-
ity growth higher than 50%. Productivity growth was particularly strong in Hong Kong and
Singapore, where more than 80% of output-per-worker growth is due to A growth. These
results conﬁrm those obtained by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and may seem at odds
with the careful study by Young (1995), which showed that the East Asian Tigers (Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea) grew mostly through factor accumulation. As pointed
out by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, the diﬀerences are mainly due to the fact that Young
does not attribute to productivity the growth in physical capital induced by productivity, as
we and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare do.
Table 10: Growth Decomposition (1960-2000) - Asian Tigers
country groups y κ H A
World average 1.84% 0.47% 1.00% 0.36%
(26%) (54%) (20%)
Asian Tigers average 5.04% 0.78% 1.02% 3.24%
(15%) (20%) (64%)
Hong Kong 5.52% -0.64% 1.09% 5.07%
(-12%) (20%) (92%)
Japan 4.04% 1.46% 0.40% 2.18%
(36%) (10%) (54%)
South Korea 5.27% 1.28% 1.70% 2.30%
(24%) (32%) (44%)
Singapore 4.90% 0.09% 0.83% 3.97%
(2%) (17%) (81%)
Taiwan 6.09% 1.23% 1.42% 3.45%
(20%) (23%) (57%)
Thailand 4.41% 1.26% 0.70% 2.45%
(29%) (16%) (56%)
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the relative contributions
of each factor to output per worker growth.
23As shown in Table 10, almost all of the diﬀerence in growth rates between the East Asian
Tigers and the world average is due to diﬀerences in productivity growth. Even though the
Asian Tigers experienced high rates of physical- and human-capital accumulation, they were
not extraordinary relative to the world ﬁgures. In particular, their annual growth rates of
the capital-output ratio and human capital per worker were only 0.31% and 0.02% above
the world average, respectively. On the other hand, their productivity grew on average
2.9% faster than world productivity. Hence, higher productivity accounted for 90% of the
3.2% annual diﬀerence in growth rates of output per worker between the East Asian Tigers
and the world average. These results place the Tigers growth experience in a very diﬀerent
perspective than that presented in Young (1995). Whereas Young (1995) argues that factor
accumulation was the key determinant of growth in East Asia, Table 10 shows that, relative
to the rest of the world, the distinguishing characteristic of the East Asian miracles was their
productivity growth.15
Figure 7 below presents the evolution of A for the Asian Tigers and the regional average.
The ﬁgure shows that, unlike what occurred in Latin America, productivity continued to
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Figure 6: Productivity of the East Asian Tigers, 1960-2000 (US, 1960=100)
15For a more thorough comparison of our results with Young (1995), see Ferreira, Pessôa and Veloso (2004).
246 Conclusions
This article presents a group of exercises on level and growth decomposition for a represen-
tative sample of countries from 1960 to 2000. The development decompositions for earlier
years reached conclusions that are quite diﬀerent from those in the literature. Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Easterly and Levine
(2001), for instance, showed that the bulk of international output-per-worker dispersion is
caused by total factor productivity diﬀerences. These studies used 1985 or later data. We
showed that at least until 1975 factors of production, namely capital and education, were the
main source of income dispersion and that productivity variance was considerably smaller
than in late years. Only after 1975 the prominence of productivity started to show up in
the data. The increase in the importance of productivity relative to factors is associated
with the reduction across the period in the variance of factors due to convergence in the
capital-output ratio and human capital per worker, and with the increase in productivity
variance in the nineties.
The growth-decomposition exercises showed that the reversal of the relative importance of
productivity vis-a-vis factors is explained by the very good (bad) performance of productivity
of fast- (slow-) growing countries in the period. Although most countries experienced capital
deepening and improvements in education, exceptional growth performances were mostly
due to productivity growth. Hence, although average growth in the period was mostly due
to factor accumulation, its variance is explained by productivity.
The importance of productivity in explaining the dispersion of output per worker reveals
the dominance of country or region-speciﬁc factors in recent development experiences. The
stagnation of Latin America, for instance, is mostly explained by a signiﬁcant decline in
productivity, while the Asian Tigers miracle is mostly a productivity miracle. The results
also present a puzzle about Latin America productivity: we found that productivity was
high in Latin America between 1960 and 1980, when competitive barriers in general, and
import substitution in particular, were highest in the region.
Although we now have a number of “TFP theories” (e.g., Parente and Prescott (2000),
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)), few studies look at its time-series behavior -
when and why “A” in a particular economy changed its path - and few empirical studies link
TFP to exogenous variables. The results in the present study indicate that these could be
very fruitful paths of research, given their importance to the understanding of development
experiences.
From a theoretical standpoint, despite the importance of productivity in explaining the
dispersion of the level and growth rates of output per worker, the implication that the
25neoclassical growth model is inconsistent with the development facts does not seem to be
warranted, for three reasons. First, factor accumulation accounts for the bulk of mean growth
of output per worker between 1960 and 2000. Second, at least until 1975, factors were the
main source of income disparity across countries. Third, at least until 1990, the increase in
the relative importance of productivity was mainly due to the reduction of factor variance (in
particular, of the capital-output ratio), which is consistent with the convergence mechanism
predicted by the neoclassical growth model. These results suggest that a version of the
neoclassical growth model, suitably modiﬁed to take into account diﬀerences in productivity,
may be a useful framework to interpret development facts.16
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7 Appendix
A List of Countries by Cultural and Regional Groups
English (-speaking): Ireland, United Kingdom, USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand.
Western Europe: Austria, Italy, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Iceland, Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.
South Europe: Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey.
Asian Tigers: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Japan.
Middle East: Syria, Tunisia, Israel, Iran, Jordan.
South Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Nepal, PapuaNewGuinea, Bangladesh,
Philippines, Fiji.
Latin America: Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Colombia, Argentina, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Bolivia, Peru,
Venezuela, Nicaragua.
Caribbean: Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, Jamaica.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Uganda,
Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, Senegal, Mozambique, Zambia, Niger, Central
African Republic, South Africa, Congo.
28Note that some countries, although we do not have data on them for either 1960 or 2000,
were still included. In particular, we used 1961 as the initial year for Tunisia. For a few
Countries we used a year other than 2000 as the last year, namely Cyprus (1996), Congo
(1997), Central African Republic and Taiwan (1998), Guyana, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and
Botswana (1999).
B List of Countries by Growth Groups
Miracles: Botswana, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Cyprus, Japan,
Ireland, Mauritius, Malaysia, Portugal, Barbados, Indonesia, Spain.
Fast Growth: Pakistan, Greece, Austria, Italy, India, Syria, Finland, Turkey, Tunisia,
Israel, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Lesotho, Norway.
Medium Growth: Panama, Malawi, Nepal, Bangladesh, Iceland, Iran, Chile, United
Kingdom, USA, Denmark, Trinidad & Tobago, Netherlands, Germany, Brazil, Sweden, Aus-
tralia, Canada, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Ecuador.
Slow Growth: Guatemala, Uganda, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, South Africa,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Uruguay, Guyana, Paraguay, Kenya, Ghana, Colombia, Argentina,
El Salvador, Costa Rica, New Zealand.
Disasters: Honduras, Cameroon, Togo, Jamaica, Bolivia, Peru, Senegal, Mozambique,
Zambia, Venezuela, Niger, Nicaragua, Central African Republic, Congo.
C Development-Accounting Results Using the Capital-
Labor Ratio as the Capital Measure
Table A.1 presents a development-accounting exercise using the capital-labor ratio as the
capital measure. See discussion in the text.
29Table A.1: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000 (capital-labor ratio)
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.84 0.65 0.16 0.03
1965 0.89 0.63 0.15 0.11
1970 0.92 0.62 0.13 0.17
1975 0.93 0.60 0.14 0.19
1980 0.99 0.57 0.14 0.28
1985 0.99 0.56 0.13 0.29
1990 1.11 0.56 0.16 0.38
1995 1.25 0.59 0.19 0.46
2000 1.32 0.60 0.21 0.50
D Development-Accounting Results Using a 7% De-
preciation Rate
Table A.2 presents a development-accounting exercise using a depreciation rate of 7% to
construct the capital-stock series. As mentioned in the text, the results are very similar to
the ones obtained in our main speciﬁcation, which uses a depreciation rate of 3.5%.
Table A.2: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000 (7% depreciation rate)
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.84 0.68 0.45 -0.28
1965 0.89 0.60 0.42 -0.13
1970 0.92 0.54 0.35 0.02
1975 0.93 0.52 0.38 0.02
1980 0.99 0.43 0.39 0.18
1985 0.99 0.40 0.36 0.22
1990 1.11 0.37 0.42 0.32
1995 1.25 0.36 0.51 0.37
2000 1.32 0.36 0.55 0.39
E Development Accounting for Subsample of Coun-
tries with Investment Data Starting in 1950
Table A.3 presents a development-accounting exercise for the subsample of 54 countries for
which there is investment data since 1950. See discussion in the text.
30Table A.3: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000 (Subsample)
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.66 0.43 0.25 -0.02
1965 0.69 0.40 0.28 0.01
1970 0.68 0.40 0.24 0.05
1975 0.68 0.41 0.25 0.02
1980 0.73 0.35 0.24 0.14
1985 0.70 0.34 0.23 0.13
1990 0.80 0.30 0.29 0.20
1995 0.88 0.29 0.36 0.22
2000 0.96 0.28 0.43 0.25
F Development Accounting with Alternative Calcula-
tion for K0
As we mentioned in the text, for many economies the procedure we use to calculate the initial
capital stock, which is standard in the literature, yields capital-output ratios far above the
observed ratio in the US. In fact, for some of these economies, we observe a reduction in
the capital-output ratio during the ﬁfties, which is inconsistent with the high investment
rates observed in the post-war period. At the same time, the marginal productivity of
capital is very low when we use this initial capital stock and the measure of A based on
it. This results from the fact that Japan and several countries in Continental Europe had
very high investment rates in the early ﬁfties, due to the reconstruction eﬀort after the
Second World War. In these cases we constructed an alternative measure of K0 so that
the marginal productivity of capital in 1950 for these economies was 20% above that of the
US. This value of the MPK seems high enough to be consistent with the investment rates
observed in the post-war period and prevents the capital-output ratio from declining in some
countries. These calculations were performed for the following countries: Austria, Italy,
Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain,
Greece, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Japan, Iran, Peru, Venezuela, Barbados,
Jamaica, Philippines, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia.
Table A.4 presents development-decomposition results based on this measure of the initial
capital stock.
31Table A.4: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000, other K0
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.84 0.61 0.41 -0.18
1965 0.89 0.57 0.41 -0.08
1970 0.92 0.54 0.35 0.03
1975 0.93 0.52 0.38 0.03
1980 0.99 0.43 0.39 0.17
1985 0.99 0.41 0.37 0.21
1990 1.11 0.37 0.44 0.30
1995 1.25 0.36 0.54 0.34
2000 1.32 0.36 0.58 0.37
The capital stock in 1950 was calculated such that the marginal
productivity of capital for some economies in 1950 was 20%
above the one in the US.
The results are similar to those reported in the text. In the sixties, the variance of factors
of production with the new calculation is smaller than when we use the standard measure
of K0. From 1970 on, the results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 1.
G Development-Accounting Results for
K0
Y0 = 2 in 1950.
Table A.5 presents a development-accounting exercise for the counterfactual capital series in
which all countries in the subsample of 54 countries for which there is investment data since
1950 start with a initial capital-output ratio equal to 2 in 1950. See discussion in the text.
Table A.5: Variance Decomposition 1960-2000 (
K0
Y0 = 2)
year var(lny) var(lnX) var(lnA) 2covar(lnX,lnA)
1960 0.66 0.23 0.31 0.11
1965 0.69 0.26 0.32 0.11
1970 0.68 0.30 0.26 0.12
1975 0.68 0.33 0.27 0.08
1980 0.73 0.29 0.26 0.17
1985 0.70 0.30 0.24 0.17
1990 0.80 0.28 0.30 0.21
1995 0.88 0.28 0.37 0.23
2000 0.96 0.26 0.44 0.25
32Figure A.1 shows the evolution between 1960 and 2000 of the relative importance of each



































































































Figure A.1: Output-per-worker variance decomposition (1960-2000) - Initial K/Y=2
H Development and Growth Accounting Using Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)’s Formulas
Instead of using (8), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) use the following formula for the
decomposition of variance of the log output per worker:
var(lnyit) = covar(lnyit,lnAit) + covar(lnyit,lnXit)
This formula amounts to splitting the covariance term, giving half to ln(X) and half
to ln(A). Table A.6 presents the results for the variance decomposition using the formula
above:















Table A.6 conﬁrms the results in the text. In particular, there is a reversal over time in the
relative importance of factors and productivity as sources of output-per-worker dispersion.
Whereas in 1960 productivity accounts for only 35% of output variance across countries, its
relative contribution increases to 58% in 2000.
Instead of using (9), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) use the following formula for
the decomposition of variance of the growth of output per worker:
var(∆lny) = covar(∆lny,∆lnA) + covar(∆lny,∆lnX)
This formula amounts to splitting the covariance term, giving half to ∆ln(X) and half
to ∆ln(A). Table A.7 presents the results for the variance decomposition using the formula
above:











Table A.7 conﬁrms the results in the text. In particular, productivity growth accounts
for 97% of the variance of output-per-worker growth between 1960 and 2000. This pattern
is also observed for all decades.
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